EVOLUTSIA.NET

Musings on Georgian politics, the Caucasus, and all things Khachapuri

Nov 26, 2010

Tbilisi’s no-force pledge: diplomatic coup or too little, too late?

by Evolutsia.Net

The dramatic announcement to the European Parliament in Strasbourg that Georgia was renouncing the use of force against the separatist regions made waves in the diplomatic community. Evolutsia.Net has a conversation about what this could mean.

Tbilisi

On November 23 in a speech to the European Parliament in Strabourg [1], Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili broke diplomatic ground by announcing that Georgia was unilaterally renouncing the use of force against the conflict zones. Although Georgia’s adherence to its the 2008 France-brokered ceasefire with Russia obligates Tbilisi to reject the use of force, a fact that Saakashvili himself highlighted, the official statement by the president explicitly ruling out military force is the first of its kind despite the de jure government’s legal right to do so.

The move is not just significant for its content, but also for its timing as it comes on the heels of a NATO summit at Lisbon that has been widely seen as a major upgrade in relations between the Atlantic alliance and its erstwhile foe, Russia. Sensing the shifting winds, is it possible that Georgia’s declaration is part of a diplomatic offensive to counter the increasing influence that Moscow now holds over NATO and Europe?

To consider some of the issues, Evolutsia.Net has a conversation with its newest associate, Nicholas Clayton. Clayton is a freelance journalist living in Tbilisi, an adjunct professor of journalism at the University of Georgia (Tbilisi), and the Caucasus Editor for The Faster Times. He also blogs at ThreeKingsblog.com. Don’t be surprised to see his name popping up more frequently on Evolutsia.Net.

Michael Cecire:

To begin, why don’t you give me your take on this?

Nick Clayton:

My initial reaction was that this is long overdue. Despite the fact that both parties technically had to reject the use of force according to the 2008 cease-fire, neither side has a been fully following that agreement since the end of the war — Russian forces have not returned to their prewar positions, and Georgia continues to fly drones over South Ossetia. So, while on paper this may seem like small potatoes, it could turn out to be a breakthrough.

Since the end of the early 1990′s wars, the South Ossetian and Abkhaz sides have, perhaps disingenuously, claimed they would not come to the table for serious negotiations until Tbilisi renounced the use of force. They claimed that it would be improper to come to an agreement with a gun pointed at their heads. Thus, by signing such a document, Tbilisi can remove that impasse to discussions. However, this move would have obviously had a much greater impact had it been made before the 2008 war, because now everyone knows that Georgia would not be able to overtake the combined separatist and Russian forces even if they tried. Meanwhile there is less impetus on the side of Tskhinvali and Sokhumi to come to a deal, now that they already have what they feel is a more comfortable arrangement with Moscow. So, in the end, this declaration is a good thing, just much too late.

Michael Cecire:

Well, I also would have preferred for there not to be a war, but I’m not sure if the decision counts as coming too late. Partially, I think that it has required the events that have occurred to even bring Tbilisi to this point, and I’m also not convinced that Russia still couldn’t have found some kind of rationale to eject Georgians from regions they controlled in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But you’re right, I would have also preferred to see this happen sooner.

I think you raise a good point about the separatist regions, though. By making this statement, Saakashvili has effectively put the ball back in their court while simultaneously currying some degree of favor in Western capitals, which are already praising the move [2]. Meanwhile, the news from Sukhumi is interesting — de facto Abkhazian foreign minister Maxim Gvinjia has kind of muttered something about their ‘suspicions’ over the news. This reliance on default rhetoric to me suggests a lack of a coherent, clear single message by the Abkhazian de facto government, who seem to have been taken by surprise [3]. Russia’s response was a little more forceful, but Moscow’s insistence on direct bilateral agreements between Tbilisi and the separatist governments comes off as a bit silly and will not be taken seriously either in Tbilisi or the West [4].

This move, paired with Tbilisi’s engagement strategy, certainly does build a case that Georgia has learned from the past few years and is learning to accept certain realities. The end goal of reunification might still remain, but there might be an understanding emerging that Georgia is not the threat that it once was. If that sense becomes widespread in the conflict regions, it could serve as leverage for all kinds of reconciliation measures down the line, including the possibility of an increased call by Abkhazian politicians to draw down the number of Russian Federal and FSB forces in their borders. By no means a foregone conclusion, but now something that is conceptually conceivable.

So, too late? Probably. But still could be a catalyst for some interesting things.

Nick Clayton:

The Abkhaz government doesn’t seem to know what to do other than repeat the typical talking points.

I mostly agree. I still think that Tbilisi cannot hope to ignore the de facto governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and make real progress. Since the war, Georgian government officials have made it a clear goal to win the semantic battle, decrying “Russian occupation” versus “renegade governments.” Such a strategy depended on outside pressure on Russia to back away from the its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and withdraw its troops. But, it was also short-sighted, unrealistic and did not hold up well against the Russian counter-narrative: that its presence was approved by governments in the territories that were (more or less) democratically elected (in Abkhazia anyway, minus the Gali Georgians and refugees). As you note, real headway is only going to be made by engaging with the people in the territories directly and getting them to choose Georgia over Russia, not by getting the rest of the world to force them to.

So far, as you pointed out, the Abkhaz government doesn’t seem to know what to do [5] other than repeat the typical talking points, and I think it is buying time. But, if this non-use of force agreement could be made official and legally recognized by international organizations, then it could be the important first step in a long process of unwinding the mistrust of the Abkhaz and Ossetians towards Tbilisi. However, I continue to fear that if Tbilisi does not see some sort of progress quickly — especially given the sensitivity of this move in internal political spheres — its penchant for short-term planning and quick fixes may rise once again to thwart its best efforts.

Michael Cecire:

You make a good point about engaging the de facto governments, but I really can’t see that translating into bilateral agreements as it could and would be seen as a total diplomatic capitulation by the Georgian government and an in-all-but-name recognition of the separatist governments as legitimate. And even though the Abkhazian de facto authorities to seem to enjoy some degree of a pluralistic mandate, that’s a far cry from believing that the de facto authorities have the power to shape an independent destiny. Even if Tbilisi won all the hearts and minds in Abkhazia today, does anyone think that Moscow would shrug it off and let them unshackle themselves from the Russian influence architecture? In that respect, I think Tbilisi is right in that it’s a fundamental Georgia-Russia conflict, which was more or less verified by the Tagliavini report. But you’re right, a real reconciliation plan will require repairing relations with the local populations, although I don’t think that means Georgia should rush into signing documents with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

Still, I’m of the same mind about Georgia’s long term plans with this thing. I think the declaration was the right step, and one that seems to be already paying diplomatic dividends [6], but there is always the question of strategic patience in Tbilisi. I am optimistic that this isn’t just a fly-by-night move, though, because it looks to me like part of a larger pattern of reality-embracing by the Georgian leadership. The engagement strategy, the declaration of the non-use of force, and the cabinet reshuffle (which deploys the highly-regarded Temur Iakobashvili to Washington to boost ties) all seem to be linked to a strategy that is mindful of Georgia’s current geopolitical limitations. Of course, like all things in the Caucasus, this could change suddenly and without warning, but I’m guardedly optimistic at this point.

Nicholas Clayton lives in Tbilisi, Georgia and works as a professor of journalism and a freelance reporter covering the Caucasus. Having studied NATO-Russian relations at Hertzen University in St. Petersburg, Russia in 2007, Clayton began blogging about the geopolitics of the former Soviet Union and initially came to the Caucasus as a multimedia stringer for the Washington Times in June 2009. He is now the Caucasus editor of the Faster Times and writes regularly for various Georgian and international publications.

Michael Cecire is the managing editor of Evolutsia.Net.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=228&info_id=5857

[2] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22899

[3] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22897

[4] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22891

[5] http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=204108

[6] http://www.news.az/articles/georgia/27208